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NATURE OF THE CASK 
This is an HC> i *n by plaintiff, Busch Corporation, dba 
c. . • . .j -.i> . .:-:JI .  ?w!. T .::• - >••'•[; \ . ••'.:;. for 
insurance coverage under liability insurance policies issued by 
defendantf-. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and Royal Insurance 
Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
.
,lv ' >r . !:- -' . . 
District O u r * qrantod the Motion Lo D L S H I I S O U L defendant, State 
Farm T?\rr ^ Visual+-y Company, and the Mo H o n for Summary Judg-
ment Uoionuoii , . , j t n .-u.raiKj^ ' L^1'^-; _. . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
x\, *-. , - t r f • , r ' > ^  * - ' ; - >'; --,-*- - -, • f 
the District Cour[ ' , i u dor s dismissing the do [ endants/ rospon-
-1 -
dents, and remand of the case for further proceedings, as more 
fully set forth in the following sections. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1978, defendant/respondent, Royal Insurance Com-
pany (hereinafter "Royal"), issued a business comprehensive 
policy, covering the policy period from February 15, 1978 to 
February 15, 1981, showing the named insured as Busch Develop-
ment, Inc. (R., p. 76) By endorsement, several additional 
named insureds were added, including "Busch-Quailbrook, a 
limited partnership." (R., p. 78) The Royal policy includes 
a section of "comprehensive general liability insurance." 
(R. p. 80) 
In 1980, defendant/respondent, State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company (hereinafter "State Farm"), issued a "condo-
minium apartment policy", covering the policy period from 
August 15, 1980 to August 15, 1981, which policy showed the 
named insured as "Busch Development Corp. dba Quailbrook 
Condominium". (R., p. 36) The State Farm policy also includes 
a section of liability coverage, and specifically identifies 
the location of the insured premises as 4650 South 9th East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R., p. 36) 
On or about September 5, 1980, various individuals 
commenced a lawsuit in Third Judicial District Court naming 
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Busch Development, Inc., and Busch Corp. as defendants (herein-
after "the prior lawsuit"). (R., p. 22) The plaintiffs in 
the prior lawsuit sought judgment of $229,000.00, plus injunc-
tive relief, for damages allegedly resulting from the construc-
tion on adjoining land of a condominium development known as 
"Quailbrook East". (R., pp. 22-26) On January 9, 1981, the 
District Court Judge in the prior lawsuit ordered that "Quail-
brook Condominium Company" be substituted as defendant in place 
of the previously identified defendants. (R., p. 29) The prior 
lawsuit was tried to a jury in April of 198 2, and Judgment was 
entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant, Quail-
brook Condominium Company, for the sum of $29,000.00 on May 20, 
1982. (R., pp. 30-32) That Judgment in the prior lawsuit is 
presently on appeal in this Court under Civil No. 18623. 
On or about February 1, 1983, Royal was notified of 
the prior lawsuit by a letter from Busch Development, Inc. 
(R., p. 88) On or about May 11, 1983, Royal declined any cover-
age under its policy, claiming prejudice based on late notice 
of the claim. (R., pp. 90-91) 
The within action was commenced September 20, 1983, 
against State Farm and Royal for indemnification for the 
Judgment entered in the prior lawsuit and attorney's fees ex-
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pended in defending the prior lawsuit and appealing that Judg-
ment. (R., pp. 2-5) Plaintiff concedes that State Farm was 
not notified of the prioa: lawsuit until the within action was 
commenced. 
In response to the Complaint in the within action, 
Royal filed an Answer containing the defenses of breach of the 
insurance contract, failure of notice, waiver, estoppel, and 
failure to mitigate damages. (R., pp. 12-13) For its response, 
State Farm filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R., p. 58) 
State Farm presented two arguments in support of its 
Motion to Dismiss. First, State Farms claims that its policy 
names only "Busch Development Corporation" as the insured; 
therefore, Quailbrook Condominium Company, against which Judg-
ment was entered in the prior lawsuit, is not entitled to 
indemnification from State Farm. (R., p. 16) Second, State 
Farm claims that the requirement of giving written notice "as 
soon as practicable" was breached, thereby relieving State Farm 
of any obligations under the insurance policy. (R., pp. 17-20) 
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting State Farm's 
Motion to Dismiss on December 6, 1983, (R. , pp. 66-68) and the 
Order of Dismissal as to State Farm was entered December 15, 
1983. (R., p. 69) 
-4-
Thereafter, Royal filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. , pp. 100-101) , advancing the same arguments which were made 
hy State Farm. (R., pp. 92-98) The District Court granted 
Royal's Motion for Summary Judgment without issuing a Memoran-
dum Decision (R., p. 106A) and Summary Judgment in favor of 
Royal was entered March 8, 1984, (R. , pp. 107-108) 
It should be noted that, due to the District Court's 
summary dismissal of the defendants from this case, the plain-
tiff has had no opportunity to.conduct any discovery with 
respect to coverage under the insurance policies of State Farm 
and Royal, including establishment of the identity of all 
insured parties. In addition, there has been no discovery 
conducted or evidence adduced regarding actual prejudice to 
those insurance companies. 
ARGUMENT 
In the Memorandum Decision granting State Farm's Motion 
to Dismiss (which was treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment) 
the District Court held: (1) no insurance coverage existed for 
Quailbrook Condominium Company under the State Farm policy and 
(2) the plaintiff/appellant failed to comply with provisions of 
the policy regarding time limits for the filing of a Proof of 
Loss and commencing legal action against the company. Although 
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no Memorandum Decision was issued with respect to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Royal, the District Court pre-
sumably applied the same reasoning in granting that Motion. 
Plaintiff/appellant contends that the District Court erred in 
both respects, thereby requiring reversal of both Summary 
Judgments. 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY 
DETERMINING THAT NO INSURANCE COVERAGE 
EXISTS FOR "QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY" 
UNDER THE STATE FARM AND ROYAL POLICIES. 
In granting Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm and 
Royal, the District Court held that Quailbrook Condominium Com-
pany was not covered by the insurance policies at issue in this 
case. This determination was made based solely on an examina-
tion of the declarations pages of the respective insurance 
policies. Plaintiff/appellant had no opportunity to conduct 
discovery regarding the records of the defendant insurance com-
panies as to what entities were actually insured under the 
policies in question. 
This Court recently reiterated the fundamental stand-
ards to be applied in ruLing on Motions for Summary Judgment: 
"Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that summary judgment is 
proper only where there is no genuine issue 
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as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. It should be granted 
only when it clearly appears that there 
is no reasonable probability that the 
party moved against could prevail. As 
this Court explained the standard: 
'Summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings, deposi-
tions , affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no 
genuine issue of material 
fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. If there 
is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact/ 
the doubt should be resolved 
in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the Court must 
evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable infer-
ences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment.1" 
(Citations omitted.) Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co. (Civd 1 
No. 18394, filed January 11, 1984).' 
In the instant case, there obviously exists a material 
issue of fact with regard to whether Quailbrook Condominj iiiii 
Company qualifies as a named insured under either policy for 
damages sustained as a result of the prior lawsuit. The State 
Farm policy shows the named insured as "Busch Development Corp. 
dba Quailbrook Condominium". The Royal policy states that 
"Busch Development, Inc." and " Busch-Quailbrook, a limited 
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partnership", among others, are the named insureds. 
It cannot be stated as a matter of law, at least at 
this stage of these proceedings, that Quailbrook Condominium 
Company is not afforded insurance coverage under either the 
State Farm or Royal policies. Therefore, the District Court 
erred in so holding. The findings in this regard should be 
reversed and remanded so that full discovery can be conducted 
on this issue to provide the District Court with sufficient 
evidence to properly determine the identity of all insureds 
under the State Farm and Royal policies. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
AN ALLEGED BREACH OF THE NOTICE CONDITIONS 
OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES RELIEVES THE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS 
THEREUNDER. 
With respect to the Motion to Dismiss filed by State 
Farm, the District Court held in its Memorandum Decision that 
the State Farm policy requires filing of a Proof of Loss with-
in sixty (60) days, per line 90 of the insurance policy, and 
that any lawsuit must be filed within one (1) year, per line 57 
(sic, line 157) of the policy. By determining the issue in 
this manner, the District Court was relieved from making any 
specific findings with respect to State Farm's defense of prej-
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udice based on late notice of the claim resulting from the prior 
lawsuit. 
However, the District Court was erroneously referring 
to the notice provisions of the policy which apply to "Section I -
Property Coverage", which provisions are found on the backside 
of the declarations page. (R., p. 36) The notice provisions 
which should have been applied by the District Court are those 
relating to "Section II - Liability Coverage" which are found 
elsewhere in the policy under "VII. Provisions Applicable Only 
to Section II" at "D. Insured's Duties in the Event of Occurrence, 
Claims or Suit" (R., p. 56) and "G. Action Against Company". 
(R., backside p. 55) 
These notice provisions of the State Farm policy are 
virtually identical to those contained in the Royal policy. 
(R., p. 87) Both policies require that notice of an occurrance 
be given to the company "as soon as practicable" and that in 
the event of claim or suit, all papers be forwarded "immediately" 
to the company. Both policies also provide: 
"No action shall lie against the company 
unless, as a condition precedent thereto, 
there shall have been full compliance 
with all of the terms of this policy, 
nor until the amount of the insured's 
obligation to pay shall have been finally 
determined either by judgment against the 
insured after actual trial or by written 
agreement of the insured, the claimant 
and the company." 
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Both State Farm and Royal argue that they were prej-
udiced because notice of the prior lawsuit had not been given 
until after the Judgment was entered and that case was pending 
on appeal. Therefore, both insurance companies claim they are 
relieved from all obligations under the contracts of insurance. 
However, no evidence was presented with respect to 
any prejudice actually suffered by the insurance defendants. 
In fact, plaintiff/appellant contends there has been no prejudice 
because the prior lawsuit had been vigorously investigated and 
defended; thus, the same course of action was followed by 
plaintiff/appellant and its counsel that would have been taken 
had the insurance companies actually been notified of and 
participated in the prior lawsuit. 
This issue of whether late notice of claim serves to 
relieve an insurance company of all duties owed to the insured 
under the policy appears to be one of first impression in Utah. 
Other states which have considered the issue have resolved it in 
various ways. In the case of Viani v. Aetna Insurance Co., 
95 Id. 22, 501 P.2nd 706 (1972), the Idaho Supreme Court iden-
tifies and reviews numerous decisions which have dealt with 
this issue, and discusses the three approaches which other 
jurisdictions have adopted. 
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One line of cases holds that breach of notice con-
ditions gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice 
to the insurer, thus permitting the insured to produce evi-
dence regarding lack of prejudice to the company. The second 
view puts the burden on the insurer to establish actual or 
substantial prejudice resulting from breach of the notice con-
ditions. A third line of cases holds that prejudice to the 
insurer is immaterial; that is, a substantial breach of 
notice conditions obviates the policy and no evidence of 
prejudice, or the lack thereof, is considered. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
adopt one of the first two approaches which would require a 
showing of actual prejudice to the insurance company before it 
is relieved of its duties to an insured. This approach would 
be most consistent with the public policy of this State re-
garding insurance transactions and the doctrines of fairness 
and equity which previal in our Courts. 
The Utah Insurance Code applies to "all insurance and 
insurance transactions in this State, or affecting subject matter 
located wholly or in part within this State." Section 31-1-12, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The Insurance Code further provides: 
"Within the intent of this Code the bus-
iness of insurance is one affected with 
the public interest, requiring that all 
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persons be actuated by good faith, ab-
stain from deception, and practice 
honesty and equity in all insurance 
matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, 
and their representatives rests the 
duty of preserving inviolate the integ-
rity of insurance." 
(Emphasis added.) Section 31-1-8, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Thus, it is clear the public policy of this State is 
that insurance transactions shall be governed by a spirit of 
fairness, justness and right dealing. This policy is severely 
undermined, if not defeated totally, by allowing an insurance 
company to escape all obligations of an insurance contract by 
merely alleging that it has been prejudiced by some action or 
inaction of the insured. 
In order to be fair and equitable to all parties con-
cerned, there should be evidence presented on which a Court can 
base a finding of prejudice, or the lack of prejudice, on the 
part of the insurer. Any other course would permit an insurance 
company to repudiate its contractual obligations by alleging any 
kind of technical breach of the insurance policy by the insured. 
In sum, guidelines should be set for a standard to be 
applied by the District Court in determining the issue of actual 
prejudice to the insurers. In order for that issue to be fully 
and fairly adjudicated, it is necessary that the fact finder 
consider evidence of the absence or presence of actual prejudice 
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to an insurance company resulting from late notice of a claim 
arising under a liability insurance policy. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the District Court in this action was 
premature in granting Summary Judgments in favor of the defen-
dants/respondents. At this point, before any discovery has been 
conducted in this matter, it is too early to determine the 
identity of all insured parties under the State Farm and Royal 
policies of insurance. In addition, permitting the defendant 
insurance companies to repudiate all contractual obligations 
under the insurance policies without demonstrating actual prej-
udice is contrary to the principals of equity and fairness which 
apply to all insurance transactions in this State. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Orders of the District 
Court granting the Motion to Dismiss of defendant/respondent, 
State Farm, and the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant/re-
spondent, Royal, should be reversed, and this case should be 
remanded to the District Court for further determination of the 
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issues of identification of the insured parties and prejudice 
to the insurance companies. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of June, 1984. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN E . ( K I P P 
KAREN J . MoCLURG 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f - / A p p e l l a n t 
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